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OPINION*
McKEE, Circuit Judge
This appeal involves Edward Forchion’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process claims arising from the seizure of his two vehicles. Forchion brings claims
against William Haumann, an assistant prosecutor and the Chief of Forfeiture at the
Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Haumann appeals the

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Forchion’s complaint names numerous defendants and raises numerous claims.
However, this appeal only involves Forchion’s procedural due process claims against
Haumann.
1

2

district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss that was based on his claim of qualified
immunity.2 For the reasons that follow, we will reverse.3
I.
On April 27, 2016, officers of the Trenton Police Department (“TPD”) raided
Forchion’s property and seized Forchion’s “NJ WEEDMAN Van,” a colorful van with
messages encouraging legalization of marijuana, and Forchion’s delivery car.4 The TPD
seized the van and the car “pending forfeiture proceedings.”5 Members of the TPD
informed Forchion that a forfeiture hearing would occur within 60 to 90 days, but no
hearing ever occurred because the decision was made not to pursue forfeiture.
Instead, on August 1, 2016, only five days after the 90-day period for a hearing
had expired, members of the TPD “caused the Van to be deemed abandoned,”6
transferred title of the van to City of Trenton, and “then caused the title in the Van to
transfer to Hawk’s Towing.”7 That same day, Hawk’s Towing stripped the van for scrap

2

Haumann also claimed absolute immunity in his motion to dismiss. He does not make
this groundless argument on appeal. See Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1419 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that a prosecutor is only entitled to qualified immunity for his postseizure management of property because he is acting in an administrative role).
3
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under the collateral-order
doctrine, we have jurisdiction because the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at
the motion to dismiss stage is considered a “final decision” within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672-75 (2009). We review a district
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds de novo. James v.
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012). At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we
must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.
4
App. 74-75 ¶ 52.
5
App. 76-77 ¶ 58; App. 81 ¶ 76.
6
App. 105-06 ¶144; App. 109 ¶ 148.
7
App. 113 ¶ 153.
3

and then crushed it. By the time Forchion contacted the TPD and learned that the van
would not be subject to forfeiture, Hawk’s towing had already destroyed the van.
Unlike the van, Mercer County retained custody of Forchion’s car for
approximately two years. In April 2018, after Forchion’s lawyers made multiple calls, a
detective contacted Forchion’s counsel and promised to release the car, which was
subsequently returned to Forchion.
II.
William Haumann, was an assistant prosecutor and the Chief of Forfeiture at the
Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office. Haumann was responsible for assessing whether
assets were forfeitable under New Jersey law, assisting officers in obtaining seizure
orders, and training officers on the civil forfeiture program. Haumann never notified
Forchion that the van and car were not subject to forfeiture proceedings. Haumann also
never notified Forchion that the van would be deemed abandoned.
Appellant summarizes the sole issue on appeal as: “The district court erred in
denying Haumann’s motion to dismiss because . . . Haumann has qualified immunity
from Forchion’s claims related to the two vehicles.”8
In the district court, Forchion alleged that Haumann failed to notify Forchion: (1)
that forfeiture proceedings would not be taken against the van and car; and (2) that the
van would be deemed abandoned and title transferred to Hawk’s Towing. Forchion
claimed that he was deprived of his property interest in the van because it was destroyed

8

Appellant Br. at 12.
4

by Hawk’s Towing, and he was deprived of his property interest in the car for the two
years it remained in Mercer County custody. All, purportedly because Haumann failed to
provide Forchion with any notice.
Haumann filed a motion to dismiss Forchion’s procedural due process claims,
alleging immunity. The district court held that Haumann was not entitled to absolute or
qualified immunity and denied Haumann’s motion to dismiss. The court “construe[d] the
deprivation Forchion challenge[d] as not the seizure of the [vehicles], but the choice to
retain [them] without following the statutorily required forfeiture procedures.”9 The court
found that Defendants’ failure to file a forfeiture action violated Forchion’s due process
rights because “[w]ithout such a filing, the proper procedural channel to reclaim his
[vehicles] was not available to Forchion, and he was deprived of his property without a
hearing.”10
III.
“An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at
the time of the challenged conduct.”11 We conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine
whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity.12 The first prong requires us to
determine whether the facts alleged demonstrate that the official’s conduct violated a

9

Liberty Bell Temple III v. Trenton City Police Dep’t, No. 3-16-cv-1339, 2019 WL
4750836, at *18 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019).
10
Id.
11
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014).
12
Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021).
5

constitutional right.13 The second prong requires us to determine whether the
constitutional right was clearly established.14 “If no constitutional right would have been
violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity.”15
The district court concluded that Forchion’s procedural due process rights were
clearly established because “[t]he right to return of seized property without delay when
forfeiture proceedings are not instituted within the statutory time frame is of
‘constitutional dimension’ and has been clearly established in New Jersey since at least
the 1980s.”16 Moreover, “[a]ny reasonable prosecutor should have known he was
violating Forchion’s constitutional rights when he made the decision to retain Forchion’s
[vehicles] without the statutorily required process.”17 We disagree. Haumann is entitled
to qualified immunity because Forchion has not sufficiently alleged a deprivation of his
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.
In any civil rights action, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant had
“personal involvement in the alleged wrongs,” which “can be shown through allegations
of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”18 The allegations “must

13

Id.
Id.
15
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
16
Liberty, 2019 WL 4750836, at *18.
17
Id.
18
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
14
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be made with appropriate particularity.”19 To succeed on a procedural due process claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest; (2) that
this deprivation was without due process; (3) that the defendant subjected the
plaintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be subjected to, this deprivation without
due process; (4) that the defendant was acting under color of state law; and
(5) that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deprivation without due
process.20
Forchion does not contend that the seizure of either the van or car deprived him of a
protected property interest. Rather, he argues that after the decision was made to not
pursue forfeiture, he was deprived of his property interest in the van when it was
destroyed, and he was deprived of his property interest in the car during the two years it
remained in Mercer County custody.
Forchion attempts to attach liability to Haumann for these alleged property
deprivations because Haumann failed to notify Forchion that (1) the Mercer County
Prosecutor’s Office was not pursuing forfeiture of the van and the car and, (2) the van
would be deemed abandoned and destroyed. However, there is not a single allegation in
the complaint21 that Haumann either subjected Forchion to, or caused Forchion to be
subjected to, the actual deprivation of his van or car.
The lengthy complaint merely alleges that the TPD seized both the van and car.
The TPD caused the van to be deemed abandoned and transferred title of the van to the
City of Trenton and then caused title to transfer to Hawk’s Towing, which purportedly

19

Id.
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1113 (3d Cir. 1989).
21
The complaint is the Third Consolidated Amended Complaint.
20
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did the TPD “a favor” and crushed the van.22 While Mercer County retained custody of
the car for two years, a detective—not an individual from the Mercer County
Prosecutor’s Office—responded to Forchion’s counsel’s inquiries and notified Forchion
that the car would be returned.
The complaint does not allege that Haumann took any action to deem the van
abandoned, transfer title of the van, or destroy the van. Similarly, the complaint does not
allege any action or decision made by Haumann to retain custody of the car. Although
Haumann was a prosecutor in the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, he is sued in his
individual capacity, and the actions of Mercer County to retain the car cannot be
attributed to him without allegations of personal involvement.23 Because Haumann had
no personal involvement in any deprivation of Forchion’s property interest, Forchion has
not demonstrated that Haumann violated Forchion’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural

22

App. 79 ¶ 68.
See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Even if Haumann deprived Forchion of a property interest,
“[t]he constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the
deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due
process.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990). Because the retention of the car
was “effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee,” Forchion
was only entitled to a “suitable postdeprivation remedy,” which includes “adequate state
post-deprivation remedies.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Revell
v. Port Auth. of New York, New Jersey, 598 F.3d 128, 138-39 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that “[a]lthough a pre-deprivation hearing is generally required before a state seizes a
person’s property,” the state’s post-deprivation procedures were an “adequate” remedy
because the defendants’ retention of the plaintiff’s property for more than two years was
random and unauthorized). Forchion cannot prevail on his claim that he was deprived of
due process by Mercer County’s retention of his car because he “has failed to explain
why New Jersey’s state procedures to recover wrongfully seized property, such as . . . the
ability to file a separate action for a writ of replevin, are insufficient.” Revell, 598 F.3d at
139.
23
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due process rights. Forchion’s attempt to overcome Haumann’s claim of qualified
immunity fails to satisfy the first prong of our inquiry. Since no constitutional deprivation
is alleged, the district court erred in denying Haumann’s claim of qualified immunity.
IV.
For the above reasons, we will vacate the district court’s order denying
Haumann’s motion to dismiss and remand with instructions to grant the motion.
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